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The aim of this paper is to examine the development of air services at UK and Irish airports 
since 1998 and to assess the impact on airport financial performance. A sample of 14 
medium/small sized UK airports and three Irish airports is used. The traffic analysis shows that 
low cost carriers have been largely responsible for strong passenger growth and increased 
passenger load at a number of regional airports. Some of these carriers use established primary 
and regional airports whilst others seek out small secondary airports. The airports with a high 
proportion of low cost traffic tend to have lower unit revenues, particularly as regards airport 
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1.  Introduction  
This paper aims to examine the development of air services at UK and Irish airports since 1998 
and to assess the impact  on airport financial performance. To achieve this aim, three research 
objectives were formulated. These were (i) to analyse the influence of air service development 
on airport traffic growth and patterns of operations; (ii) to examine the relationship between 
these traffic characteristics and key airport financial indicators; and (iii) to investigate the role 
which charging policies and incentives play in encouraging air service provision. 
 
 In 1998 full European airline deregulation had just occurred, which promised new opportunities 
and greater competition (Doganis, 2006). One of the most visible impacts of this was the rise of 
the low cost carrier (LCC) sector which placed new and challenging demands on the airport 
industry (Barrett, 2004). At the same time, airport commercialisation, whereby airports adopted 
more businesslike management philosophies and acted more competitively, continued to be a 
trend. In some cases it led to partial or full airport privatisation (Graham, 2003). Meanwhile the 
global aviation industry entered into an unprecedented era of volatility and uncertainty brought 
about by the attacks of 9/11, further terror scares and the outbreak of SARS. 
 
The most dramatic growth in LCC activity within Europe during the study period was 
experienced in the UK and Ireland. These two countries have produced the two largest and 
strongest European LCCs, namely easyJet and Ryanair. In the face of this threat, British 
Airways and Aer Lingus have taken dramatic steps to remain competitive. BA has scrapped 
minimum stay restrictions on the cheapest short-haul fares while Aer Lingus has embraced 
other low-cost product features such as an emphasis on direct internet sales and charging for 
food and drink. Moreover British Midland has now introduced its bmibaby low-cost product to all 
services operated with mainline jet aircraft.  
 
As regards the airport industry, the UK has the greatest number of partially or fully privately 
owned airports (under different ownership) in the world. Meanwhile although airport privatisation 
has been discussed in Ireland, the three largest airports (Dublin, Cork and Shannon) remain 
under 100 per cent government control. Up until October 2004, these airports were owned by a 
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semi-state company called Aer Rianta. This has subsequently been renamed Dublin Airport 
Authority (DAA) and the airports are being organised into three autonomous state companies. In 
both countries there has been considerable debate in recent years regarding future capacity 
provision which culminated in the publication of ‘The Future of Air Transport’ White Paper in the 
UK and the decision to build a second terminal at Dublin airport (Department for Transport, 
2003a; Department of Transport, 2005). Within this context of capacity provision and 
corresponding policy decisions, the role of regional airports and their evolving nature, has 
become an area of popular discussion (Graham and Guyer, 2000; Humphreys and Francis, 
2002). Of particular interest are route development funds (RDFs) which have recently been 
provided by some UK regional development bodies to support new services which are deemed 
beneficial to a region’s overall economic development (Civil Aviation Authority, 2005). 
This paper concentrates on small and medium sized airports in the UK and Ireland where the 
LCC developments have been the most significant. Section 2 discusses the methodological 
issues and introduces the sample airports. Section 3 provides an overview of the traffic and 
financial trends at the airports. Section 4 then goes on depth to look at traffic developments at 
the individual airports. Section 5 explores the impact of these on financial performance and this 
leads onto a discussion about the use of financial incentives and RDFs to encourage traffic 
growth in section 6. The final section 7 draws some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
Whilst this paper begins by considering all UK airports and the three main Irish airports, a  
smaller sample of 14 UK airports has been used subsequently to enable a  more in-depth 
examination to be undertaken (Figure 1). This UK sample was drawn from only a possible 22 
airports which each recorded more than half a million passengers in 2003and hence was 
considered sufficiently representativeSince the  focus here  is  primarily on medium/small sized 
airportsthe large airports of London Heathrow and Gatwick have  not been  included in the 
detailed analysis. The exact sample was selected so as to include a broadly equal balance of 
airports with a high, medium and low/no dependence on low cost carriers,  
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The schedule data for this analysis  are taken from the OAG flight guide and focus on 1998, 
2003 and 2005. The traffic and financial data come primarily from the annual reports of the 
airports in question and the statistical databases in the UK of the Civil Aviation Authority, the 
Department for Transport and the Centre of Regulated Industries. The financial and traffic data 
are mostly for the year April-March (e.g. FY2003 = April 2003-March 2004), although some of 
the traffic data are for the calendar year.  Individual financial data are not available for the three 
separate Irish airports and so for the financial assessment the three airports have to be 
considered together. In addition much of the DAA data are related not only to operations at the 
Irish airports but also to other activities of the airport group such as Great Southern hotels, the 
provision of commercial activities at overseas airports and the partial ownership of Birmingham 
and Hamburg airports – and so this cannot be included. Published airport charges details have 
been obtained from the IATA Airport Charges Manual and from the airports but it has not been 
possible, for confidentiality reasons, to obtain details of the more useful actual airport charges  
which may be considerably lower because of airport price incentives to the airlines.    
It is very difficult to precisely define a LCC operation and for some of the services under 
consideration, there are equally convincing arguments for including them under a low cost 
definition as there are arguments against this. Moreover certain airlines such as Aer Lingus, 
Flybe and BMI have changed the nature of their operations during the study period under 
consideration. A measure such as cost per available seat-kilometre could theoretically be used 
but data for this measure are not available for Ryanair. An alternative approach is to use a 
classification based on the ‘frills’ offered. For example, the UK Department for Transport and 
Civil Aviation Authority have a ‘No Frills Carrier’ definition which covers easyJet, Ryanair, 
bmibaby, Jet2 and FlyGlobespan (Department for Transport, 2003b). However since this 
classification was defined in 2003 it does not include overseas scheduled airlines such as Air 
Berlin and Germanwings, nor the UK charter or ‘leisure’ carrier Thomsonfly, all of whom have 
subsequently significantly expanded their no frills operations. Nor does it include Flybe which 
only consistently started marketing itself as a low cost or no frills carrier since 2003, and 
moreover has some characteristics, particularly its use of smaller regional aircraft, which are not 
common for low cost operationsIn spite of these shortcomings, this is the only classification for 
which a published breakdown of traffic is available and so it has been adopted here.  Hence 
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whilst the major LCCs are included in this  classification, some of the less clearly defined 
airlines are not – although it has been possible to discuss them in the schedule analysis. In 
Ireland, Ryanair, bmibaby, FreshAer and Skynet services are classified as low cost although 
there could be an argument for now including Aer Lingus as well because of its transformation 
in recent years from a full service airline to a carrier which now has more in common with the 
LCC sector. 
 
3.  Overall traffic and financial trends 
 
Initially an assessment of the overall traffic and financial performance of all the UK airports 
above half a million passengers, together with the three Irish airports (which account for around 
97 per cent of all Irish traffic (McLay and Reynolds-Feighan, 2006)), has been undertaken to put 
in context what has been happening at the individual sample airports. This shows that there has 
been a significant variation in the growth patterns for different types of traffic between 1998-
2003 (Figure 2). In the UK whilst the volume of full service and charter traffic has overall 
remained relatively unchanged after the six years, the most dramatic growth has occurred with 
the LCCs on short-haul scheduled routes, particularly international services, where passenger 
numbers have increased from 7 million in 1998 to 44 million in 2003. An equivalent split of traffic 
is not available for the Irish airports but from the data which are accessible it is apparent that the 
greatest growth has been achieved with mainland European services (14 per cent average 
annual growth) which again is primarily due to the growth in LCC services (Figure 3) 
 
In total the UK airports experienced an average annual growth rate in passengers of 4.5 per 
cent between FY1998 and 2003 with the traffic at the London airports growing more slowly than 
elsewhere (Table 1).  In Ireland, passengers numbers at the Dublin, Cork and Shannon airports 
increased from 14 million in 1998 to 20 million in 1993, representing an average annual rise of 
6.9 per cent - comparable to growth at the UK regions. This was fuelled by the continued growth 
of Ryanair, together with the buoyant Irish economy.  
 
 6 
Revenue from airport charges at the UK airports in real terms grew by 4.1 per cent  which was 
slightly below the passenger growth rates. Interestingly whilst the relative passenger increase in 
London was lower than in the regions, the growth in real airport charges was higher and vice 
verse for the regional airports. This suggests that the regional airports may have been more 
active in reducing their charges or keeping them competitive to stimulate growth. However the 
revenues levels were also strongly influenced by the fact that Heathrow was allowed to increase 
its charges quite substantially in 2003 when a new price cap was set by the regulator, primarily 
to cover investment costs at the new Terminal 5.  Revenue from charges in Ireland rose mostly 
because of the phasing out in the late 1990s of the generous discount scheme which had been 
in place for a number of years – in preparation for the abolition of intra-EU duty and tax free 
sales in 1999. In more recent years, however, charges revenue in Ireland has fallen significantly 
in real terms since the introduction of price regulation in 2001.  Overall real growth in 
commercial revenue appeared to be more closely related to traffic growth. However over the 
period in question, these revenues did not growth as fast as passenger numbers and this may 
well reflect the negative impact of the abolition of EU duty free sales.  There was not such a 
large difference between London and the regional airports when costs were concerned. As a 
result of these trends in revenue and cost performance, overall profits at UK airports increased 
but did not match the traffic growth in either London or the regions.  
 
4. Traffic developments at the airports 
 
Within the sample of airports, the mix of traffic varies significantly (Figure 4). There are five UK 
airports, namely Prestwick, Liverpool, Belfast International, Nottingham and Bristol, where LCC 
passengers were the most important type of traffic (over 45 per cent of the total)  in 2003 – 
these have been named group 1 airports. There are a further six airports (group 2: Dublin, 
Shannon, Cork, Cardiff, Glasgow, Newcastle) where LCC traffic still represented a significant 
share (over 15 per cent) of the traffic. The remaining airports (group 3: Durham Tees Valley, 
Aberdeen, Manchester, Humberside, London City, Belfast City) had little or no LCC services, 
relying either on conventional scheduled carriers, as at London City airport, or charter 
operations, as at Humberside airport. By contrast in 1998 Prestwick was the only airport which 
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was highly dependent on low cost traffic (79 per cent of total) and only Liverpool and the Irish 
Airports could have been defined as having a significant share.  
 
Between FY1998-2003 four out of the five group 1 airports recorded the highest growth rates in 
total and scheduled passenger numbers and likewise most of lowest growth rates for scheduled 
traffic were group 3 airports which had little or no involvement with LCCs (Table 2). In the vast 
majority of cases scheduled traffic has grown at a faster rate than charter traffic.  
 
It therefore appears that the development of low cost traffic is the major driving force behind the 
airports with the highest growth rates. For this reason at airports where there have been 
significant developments with these airlines (group 1 and 2 airports) a detailed analysis of the 
schedules for 1998and 2003 has been undertaken. Moreover whilst traffic details are not yet 
available for 2005, schedule information was accessible and hence is included to give some 
insight into the most recent developments. . In addition to group 1 and 2  airports, Manchester is 
included in the schedule analysis because it is of a more comparable size to Dublin than the 
other airports and faces considerable LCC competition at neighbouring airports, particularly 
Liverpool. Belfast City is also included as it is in direct competition with Belfast International (a 
number of services having shifted between the two airports in recent years) and about two 
thirds of its traffic is with flybe – which as discussed can in some ways be considered as a LCC.  
 
The number of flights operated has not increased as fast as the number of passengers handled 
at most of the sample airports in the schedule analysis (Table 3). This is because the low-cost 
carriers tend to operate relatively large aircraft (149 seat Boeing 737-700s and A319s for 
easyJet; 189 seat 737-800s for Ryanair) at high load factors. On routes where the low-cost 
carriers have replaced a previous regional aircraft service then frequencies may actually have 
gone down. This is particularly apparent when a hub feeder service has also been lost, as this 
can more than offset any growth in the local market. For example, Nottingham to Amsterdam 
had 43 flights per week by bmi and KLMuk in 1998 but now has just 13 by bmibaby. Belfast 
International to Amsterdam had 20 flights per week by KLMuk in 1998 but is now reduced to 7 
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by easyJet. Cardiff to Glasgow, a simple point-to-point service has dropped from 16 flights by 
BA (Manx) to 12 by bmibaby and Newcastle-Dublin from 20 by Aer Lingus to 13 by Ryanair. 
 
 
Group 2 and 3 airports such as Belfast City, Dublin and Glasgow have only seen modest growth 
in the number of scheduled flights operated over the last seven years. In the case of Belfast 
there has been some reshuffling of services between the airports leaving what is left of the 
traditional industry along with flybe at Belfast City while Belfast International specialises in low-
cost, charter and transatlantic. In contrast, airports with a low starting base and major low cost 
carrier expansion have seen dramatic changes (e.g. the group 1 airports of Prestwick, 
Liverpool, Bristol).  
Table 4 compares the average passenger load on scheduled services at these airports for 1998 
and 2003 still prior to Ryanair’s full conversion to 737-800s). This has doubled at Cardiff (from 
27 to 59 passengers) and Nottingham (from 36 to 72 passengers) and increased by around 50 
per cent at the other low-cost dominated locations. Typical load on low-cost services is around 
100 passengers, still diluted in the total airport figures by remaining regional aircraft operations. 
Manchester has seen a static average passenger load moving their position from one of the 
largest in 1998 (67 passengers/ATM)to below average in 2003 (69 passengers/ATM)). Over the 
same period, neighbouring Liverpool has surged from 51 passengers/ATM to 93. Low-cost 
carriers therefore clearly lead to a more efficient utilisation of airfield capacity (aprons, runways), 
although ironically this is not generally in short supply at the secondary airports favoured by low-
cost airlines. 
 
The growth of low-cost operations has led to a large number of new destinations being served 
with direct flights although these are typically at low frequency (e.g. once daily). Table 5 shows 
that the low-cost dominated airports typically offer 30-40 non-stop scheduled destinations in 
2005, up from 10-15 in 1998. The major expansion has been in European services and whereas 
the original international links were to major hubs and business centres, leisure destinations 
have been the main growth area. Due to the large increment of capacity that must be added in 
moving from a daily to a twice daily service with a Boeing 737, LCCs tend to expand by adding 
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routes much faster than frequencies from the smaller airports in their network. Belfast City which 
handles only UK and Ireland traffic has seen no net growth in network coverage as it already 
served most of the worthwhile locations in this region. Here, growth has been in traffic volume 
on existing routes. 
 
The network development of the LCCs (and the other operators which have largely embraced 
the low-cost business model) essentially follows one of  several key patterns: 
 
easyJet, FlyGlobespan, Jet2, bmibaby, Aer Lingus (on short-haul routes) 
 
These airlines have concentrated on markets where there is a strong demand, using some 
primary airports and established regional airports. easyJet is the dominant operator, based on 
Bristol, Nottingham, Liverpool, Newcastle and Belfast International but the other airlines have 
found a niche in airports not yet developed by easyJet but flying to the same type of 
destinations – such as Manchester (Jet2 and bmibaby), Glasgow (FlyGlobespan) and Dublin 
and Cork (Aer Lingus). 
 
Destination points for these networks fall into three key categories: major domestic cities, (e.g. 
Edinburgh, Belfast, London), major charter destinations (e.g. Alicante, Malaga, Faro) and mixed 
business/leisure destinations (e.g. Amsterdam, Geneva, Prague, Nice). These airlines are not 
generally interested in solely  business oriented markets or inbound markets which rules out 
most of Germany and Scandinavia. They also avoid most secondary leisure destinations where 
there is not an established demand. This strategy inevitably puts them into conflict with the 
traditional airlines. On some routes they co-exist (e.g. Bristol-Edinburgh operated by BA and 
easyJet; Manchester-Gatwick BA and Jet2). In others the traditional airline has withdrawn (e.g. 
Bristol-Newcastle was BA now easyjet; Cardiff to Edinburgh was BA now bmibaby).  
 
Airport charges are not the over-riding factor for these airlines. More important is the ability to 
obtain higher yields and strong load factors. easyJet has expanded operations at Gatwick 
despite having to contend with one of the most congested runways in Europe Usually either a 
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modest market share is required or the conditions are right to stimulate demand (attractive 
destinations with high existing fare levels).. Although lower charges were probably a factor in 
easyJet's decision to develop Liverpool rather than Manchester as its northwest base, other 
airlines have emerged to fill this gap (although competing on a limited selection of routes 
compared to the traditional scheduled network from Manchester) and a similar process has 
taken place at Glasgow. Jet2 and FlyGlobespan are aiming for higher yields than would be 
possible out of Liverpool or Prestwick Aer Lingus has revised its network from Dublin to focus 
on similar destinations to those of easyJet or Jet2 out of the UK. 
 
Several former charter airlines (e.g. Monarch. My Travel Lite) operate on familiar territory to 
traditional charter destinations in the Mediterranean. As has always been the case with 
charters, some of these are at low frequency (once or twice per week), particularly where 
smaller airports are involved. bmibaby has found some of its markets too thin for viable low-cost 
operations with a Boeing 737 and has leased ATR42 capacity from Air Wales at Cardiff (e.g. 
Cardiff-Glasgow and Paris) while returning other routes to bmi regional at Nottingham (e.g. 
Nottingham-Brussels and Paris) and leaving routes such as Manchester-Aberdeen in the same 
hands.  
 
Ryanair, Thomsonfly,  
 
There is a different path in terms of network structure, exemplified by Ryanair.. Ryanair avoids 
primary airports (except for a Dublin service in some cases). Traditional route planning is largely 
dispensed with in favour of setting the airports in competition with each other for new services 
and negotiating the most favourable deal. Many European end points are also secondary 
airports (e.g. Prestwick-Hahn) and some are not in conventional markets for outbound leisure 
travel from the UK and Ireland. This tends to lead to low yields and low frequencies but also 
very low costs. These airports are generally uncongested, permitting shorter turn-around, 
taxiing and flying times, leading to better aircraft and crew productivity which is of similar 
significance to low airport charges in reducing total costs. Ryanair often threatens to fly 
elsewhere, or actually relocates services, if its demands at airports are not met. For example, it 
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moved 70 per cent of its services from Birmingham to Nottingham in 2004, allegedly because of 
a 100 per cent increase in airport charges (Civil Aviation Authority, 2005). Ryanair has shown 
itself able to massively stimulate demand through low fares and non-stop services and to divert 
traffic from other more distant airports where there is a natural demand for air travel. 
Passengers are willing to undertake long surface journeys if  they are making a large saving on 
the air fare. Thomsonfly have also favoured small secondary airports excluded from this 
analysis for development of their scheduled services. Examples include Doncaster Robin Hood, 




Flybe have found a potential niche by going to certain airports (not in the sample) in isolated 
parts of the UK - which may have a strong regional identity - but represent too small a market 
even for Ryanair (e.g. Exeter, Norwich) or have operational restrictions on the use of 737 
equipment (e.g. Southampton or Guernsey). Flybe's destinations are primarily domestic which 
gives them a greater business travel focus however. In the case of Belfast City and 
Birmingham, flybe operates from airports with a greater attraction to business travellers than the 
rival airports of Belfast International and Nottingham. They hence sit on the middle ground 
between the regional airlines and the LCCs, which is reflected in higher yields than most LCCs.. 
To Europe their network shows more in common with Ryanair than easyJet, featuring obscure 
French, Mediterranean and Alpine airports. For many of these airports flybe is the only game in 
town, hence the airline's negotiating position is strengthened.  
 
5. Financial performance comparisons 
 
Although the LCCs have been largely responsible for the strong growth at regional airports, their 
operations has been encouraged by the simultaneous changes at the regional airports which 
have resulted in a much more commercial airport industry, with a more pro-active approach in 
seeking ways to develop their traffic. Therefore it is interesting to compare the financial 
performance of the airports with varying levels of involvement with LCCs. Beginning with unit 
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revenues (measured by revenues per Work Load Unit (WLU) when the WLU is equivalent to 
one passenger or 100 kg freight) it is apparent that aeronautical revenue is lowest at a number 
of group 1 airports (Belfast International, Liverpool and Nottingham) and highest at a number of 
group 3 airports (Durham Tees Valley, Humberside, London City) (Table 6).  
 
In terms of commercial revenue, Belfast International, Liverpool and Nottingham, again have 
some of the lowest unit revenues and airports in group 3 have some of the highest. It is often 
suggested by airlines that even if low cost airlines do not bring much aeronautical revenue to 
airports, their passengers will spend money in the retail and catering facilities at the airports and 
hence will have a net effect of growing the revenues. Many low cost passengers are not budget 
travellers and are therefore quite willing, given the opportunity to spend at airports, to do so just 
as other passengers. Moreover it has been argued, for example by easyJet, that low cost 
passengers actually make very good shoppers at airports. This is since they encourage 
passengers to check-in early because of their first come, first served boarding procedure and 
also because the airline allows for minimum dwell time at the gates. These two factors may 
increase the time available for shopping. Furthermore the minimal catering on board 
encourages the use of airport catering facilities and in addition easyJet tends to have a longer 
operating day which ensures better use of commercial facilities (Winter, 2005). Whilst this may 
be true, at least for easyJet operations, adequate retail facilities must be in place to start with to 
enable these advantages to be exploited.  This may mean that airports which are interested in 
developing a long-term future with low cost carriers need to revisit their business model and 
further expand their dependence on the non-aeronautical revenue side of their operations 
(Francis et al, 2004). This greater reliance on non-aeronautical sources does not appear to be 
apparent at least with Belfast International, Liverpool and Nottingham. However Bristol performs 
much better in the commercial area which may partly be explained by its new terminal which 
was opened in 2000. Prestwick also generates more commercial revenue but much of this from 
its property and land related activities rather than commercial facilities inside the terminal.  
 
When unit costs are considered, again the group 1 airports tend to have the lowest costs and 
the group 3 airports the highest. . Many factors could explain this but  it may be that the group 1 
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airports are providing more basic lower cost facilities or that the high growth patterns which 
have been experienced by these airports have enabled them to achieve much greater resource 
utilisation which has subsequently lowered their unit costs. Moreover Durham Tees Valley, 
Humberside and London City are comparatively small airports and most research indicates that 
unit costs for small airport tend to be higher (e.g. Pels et al, 2003). By combining the unit 
revenue and cost figures to produce operating margins (i.e. operating profits as a percentage of 
total revenue) there now appears to be very little relationship between this and the presence of 
low cost operations with the lower revenue and cost airports not consistently performing better 
or worse than the other airports. Thus at a first glance there does appear to be some 
relationship between revenue and cost levels and the share of low cost traffic, but not 
profitability. One other key observation is that Belfast City airport appears to perform in a much 
more similar way to the group 1 airports than the group 3 airports which again raises doubts as 
to whether its classification as a non LCC airport is correct given the presence of flybe. 
 
6. Using financial incentives and RDFs to encourage traffic growth 
 
The impact of aeronautical charging policies is now further investigated by making a 
comparison of charges in 2003 for the sample airports, when this information was available. 
Representative airport charges have been calculated using the Boeing 737- 800 aircraft with a 
70 per cent load factor giving 125 passengers and indexed with the average being equal to one 
(Figure 6). In general, there does not appear to be a clear relationship between low cost 
operations and the level of airport charges. However a comparison of published airport charges 
does not necessarily provide an indication of the comparative prices which airlines have actually 
paid the airport operator  because of the discounts on airport charges which are used by many 
airports, particularly to ‘kick-start’ the inauguration of new routes. These new service incentives 
may not only include reductions in airport charges but also marketing support to help develop 
new routes. In return for reduced charges the airline may guarantee to base a certain number of 
aircraft or operations at the airport, or commit itself to a certain number of years at the airport.  
Such discounts are particularly attractive to low cost airlines since airport charges and handling 
costs represent a large share of their costs, for example 30 per cent at easyJet (Winter, 2005). 
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This is because such airlines have tended to minimise all other cost and the short-haul nature of 
much of their operations means these charges are levied frequently throughout the day.  
 
Most airports keep details about these incentives confidential but it is possible from some to 
glean an idea of the scale of these. As regards new routes there are typically two approaches. 
Firstly an all-inclusive passenger charge will replace the weight related landing charge and 
separate passenger charge. The advantage of this for the airline is that the charge will now be 
totally based on passenger numbers and so will be relatively small at the initial stages when 
passengers numbers are low and need to grow.  This type of incentive is offered, for example, 
at Manchester, Shannon and Cork airports (Table 7). An alternative is to offer a straightforward 
discount on all charges, perhaps differing between domestic and international services as is the 
case at Glasgow, or just being offered on certain services, such as non-EU flights at Dublin.  In 
addition market support is offered at three different levels at Dublin (5,000-19,000 Euros, 
25,000-50,000 Euros, >50,000 Euros) depending on a set of market development criteria 
(Dublin Airport Authority, 2005). The confidential nature of these incentives means that it is also 
difficult to identify their overall impact on the airport finances. However it is known that at 
Manchester airport, marketing support amounted to around £7m or around 3 per cent of total 
costs in 2001/2 (Competition Commission, 2002). At the Irish Airports discounts and marketing 
support amounted to more than 90 million euro between 1999 and 2003 (Aer Rianta, 2004). 
 
An indication of the overall level of discounting may be obtained by comparing relative airport 
rankings from published airport charges with relative rankings from aeronautical revenue per 
WLU values (again indexing this with the average equivalent to one) – although that this may 
not pick up on all the incentives as some may be classified as a ‘marketing support’ cost rather 
than a reduction in charges (Figure 6). The most significant differences with the UK airports 
occur with Belfast International and Nottingham East Midlands airport where the relative ranking 
of aeronautical revenue is much less than with the charges. Both these airport have a high 
proportion of low cost traffic – suggesting much discounting. By contrast relative rankings of 
revenues are higher than charges at Manchester and Glasgow where the proportion of low cost 
traffic is much less and it is less likely that discounting takes place. Moreover whilst aeronautical 
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revenues per WLU at Glasgow airport have declined by less than five per cent per annum in 
real terms since 1998, at Belfast International the equivalent reduction has been more than 15 
per cent per annum. This limited evidence thus appears to support the view that much of the 
recent growth at UK and Irish airports has been in part been driven by the rapid development of 
the LCC and the competitive pricing deals which have been agreed with many of the airports. A 
key and much debated issue, however, is whether this current situation can be sustained into 
the future as the sector matures, and particularly as many of the incentives given to the airlines 
unwind. Moreover the recent European Commission’s guidelines for publicly owned airports 
which limit the amount of incentives given and the time period during which they are applicable, 
adds further uncertainty for the future (European Commission, 2005), but is perhaps less 
relevant in the UK given the predominantly private airport industry.  
 
Whilst the introduction of LCCs can be useful in filling spare capacity at minimal cost for the 
airport operators, continual growth will mean that at some stage there will be a need for future 
investment which may not be covered by the low aeronautical revenues (Rozario, 2004). There 
is also an indication from this limited research that the non-aeronautical revenues at certain 
airports have not been increased to the extent to which they may fully compensate for the 
reduced aeronautical revenue. In making investment decisions, consideration has to be given 
as to whether to provide new facilities at a very basic low cost level, which many low cost 
carriers appear to demand, or to build to a higher quality specification to encourage better retail 
opportunities. A compromise position might be a lower cost facility such as the so-called T2 in 
Glasgow which if used enables the airlines to qualify for a 25 per cent rebate on passenger 
charges, but also allows the passenger access to the other commercial facilities at the airport. 
As the landing charge still has to be paid in full, however, this is likely to be well below the level 
of discount that low-cost carriers are seeking. 
 
In many instances, incentives at regional airports have been given to achieve the broader 
objective of encouraging economic development in the surrounding area. This is this situation 
when the airport is in public hands which is fairly rare in the UK. However there is now the 
example of the route development funds (RDF). These are funds provided by regional 
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development bodies to support new services which are deemed beneficial to the region’s overall 
economic development by encouraging better business links or inbound tourism. Moreover such 
funds are designed to have a catalytic impact in that airlines can potentially share the same 
based aircraft on these supported routes which bring inbound benefits, with using them on 
additional non-subsidised outbound leisure services. The support, which must comply with the 
EC guidelines, is given as discounts on airport charges, limited to a three year period, and must 
be matched by an equal commitment by the airport operator. The first RDF, amounting to £6.8 
million for three years was created in 2002 by the Scottish Executive and managed by Scottish 
Enterprise. Then in 2003 a £4 million three year fund was set up by the Northern Ireland 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment and managed by Invest Northern Ireland. In 
the UK Airports White Paper of December 2003, other regional development agencies and the 
Welsh Assembly Government were invited to consider such funds and some have been doing 
this. At the sample Scottish airports by the end of 2005, Aberdeen had five supported routes, 
Glasgow three and Prestwick nine.  The non-sample airport Edinburgh, has also been a major 
beneficiary of the Scottish fundsand there have been a small number of new routes at 
Inverness, Sumburgh, and Kirkwall as well. In Northern Ireland, Belfast International had six 
routes, Belfast City one and non-sample airport Derry one.. Not all the routes have been 
successful, however, with the most notable example being the five routes operated out of 
Edinburgh by Duo which went out of business (Pagliari, 2005) . Nevertheless, an analysis 
undertaken by the Civil Aviation Authority, led to the conclusion that overall the RDFs had 
helped in providing a limited ‘kick-start’ to new services and in raising the profile of the airports 




This paper has shown that at a number of UK and Irish airports since 1998, LCCs have been 
largely responsible for strong passenger growth, increased passenger load and a greater offer 
of European services. These airports tend to have lower unit revenues, particularly as regards 
airport charges, but also lower unit costs and there is no overall obvious link between airport 
profitability and low cost operations. The conventional assumption that traffic growth is always 
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beneficial for an airport does need to be questioned however. It is perhaps more important to 
first determine the objectives of an airport. Is it to produce as high a profit margin as possible or 
simply to increase turnover? Is it to improve accessibility to or from a region or simply to find a 
purpose for under-utilised infrastructure? The answers will be different depending on the 
circumstances. The market emphasis of the low-cost airlines has been mainly on outbound 
tourism from the UK but has undoubtedly stimulated inbound tourism to Ireland. The RDF 
initiatives have tried to address this in Scotland and Northern Ireland by targeting inbound travel 
and providing essential links for the business community but it appears questionable as to 
exactly what demand some of these routes are meeting. There is the further issue that a hub 
link by the hub airline can provide global accessibility and effective marketing overseas, 
whereas a point-to-point service on the same route by a LCC is primarily destined to cater for 
local outbound leisure traffic.  
 
The research in this paper has been challenging due to the problems of an appropriate LCC 
definition and the subsequent choice of a representative airport sample. Further research would 
be useful in determining whether the findings which are presented here are also applicable to 
the non-sample UK airports. However as the low cost industry evolves, the problem of a LCC 
definition is likely to become even more difficult, or perhaps irrelevant, as other traditional and 
charter carriers react to the development of this sector. Moreover this paper has shown how 
some carriers such as easyJet use primary airports and established regional airports whereas 
others such as Ryanair are keener to seek out small secondary airports. This means that these 
airlines have varying price sensitivities, as well as different traffic characteristics., and hence will 
have different impacts on an airport’s financial performance. Data limitations have not allowed 
generalisations concerning these different impacts to be made but as this sector continues to 
grow, so will the availability of data related to different types of airlines, not only in the UK and 
Ireland but also elsewhere in Europe, and hence there will be greater opportunities for more 
developed and detailed research in this important area. A debate is perhaps only just beginning 
on whether the surge in air travel demand created by the Low Cost Carriers is economically or 
environmentally sustainable. It is also uncertain where the equilibrium point between the LCCs 
and the network airlines will eventually lie. The performance of the secondary and regional 
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airports is therefore highly dependent upon national and international policy decisions as well as 
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4.5 4.1 3.0 4.3 2.0 
London 
airports 
3.3 5.3 2.2 4.8 1.5 
UK regional 
airports 
6.8 2.4 5.3 3.5 3.0 
DAA Irish 
airports 
6.9 9.8 n/a n/a n/a 
 (*) All airports with > 0.5 million terminal passengers in 2003 excluding Belfast City and Prestwick when not all data  
were available. (+) Cork, Dublin, Shannon 
Sources: CRI, DAA 
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Table 2: Traffic growth at sample airports 1998-2003 
 
Airport Terminal passengers 
(mns) 
Average annual passenger growth  
1998-2003 
 1998 2003 Total Scheduled Charter 
Group 1 (high dependence on low cost traffic) 
Belfast Int.   2.6 4.0 8.5 9.6 5.1 
Bristol   1.8 3.9 16.5 26.0 5.5 
Liverpool   0.9 3.2 29.6 34.1 12.1 
Nottingham    2.1 4.3 14.8 28.4 2.5 
Prestwick   0.6 1.9 27.1 28.1 17.8 
Average   1.6 3.5 19.3 25.2 8.6 
Group 2 (some dependence on low cost traffic) 
Cardiff   1.2 1.9 9.1 25.3 0.8 
Cork   1.3 2.2 10.7 n/a n/a 
Dublin 11.5 15.8 6.5 n/a n/a 
Glasgow   6.5 8.1 4.6 5.3 3.1 
Newcastle   2.9 3.9 6.0 10.2 1.3 
Shannon   1.4 2.0 6.9 n/a n/a 
Average   4.1 5.7 7.3 13.6 1.7 
Group 3 (little or no dependence on low cost traffic) 
Aberdeen    2.7 2.5 -1.1 -0.1 -3.8 
Belfast City   1.3 2.0 8.5 8.6 -15.8 
Durham T.Valley   0.7 0.7 1.4 -1.2 4.9 
Humberside   0.3 0.5 8.5 3.6 10.9 
London City   1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 -18.1 
Manchester 17.2 19.5 2.6 5.4 -0.1 
Average   4.0 4.5 3.6 3.0 -3.7 
Sources: CAA, DAA  
 
Table 3: Development of flight frequencies 1998-2005 
 
Number of scheduled departing flights in first week of July Airport 
1998 2003 2005 
Belfast City 329 340 365 
Belfast International 266 275 403 
Bristol 235 378 488 
Cardiff 121 168 180 
Cork 162 339 291 
Dublin 1324 1562 1513 
Glasgow 737 777 932 
Liverpool 127 289 460 
Manchester 1181 1537 1749 
Newcastle 334 333 463 
Nottingham 230 293 288 
Prestwick 77 144 168 




Table 4: Average passenger load - scheduled services 1998 and 2003 
 
Passengers/air transport movement Airport 
1998 2003 
Belfast City 39 62 
Belfast International 74 106 
Bristol 34 63 
Cardiff 27 59 
Cork 39 62 
Dublin 79 97 
Glasgow 60 75 
Liverpool 51 93 
Manchester 67 69 
Newcastle 44 69 
Nottingham 36 72 
Prestwick 53 93 
Shannon 37 74 
Source: CAA, DAA 
 
Table 5: Network coverage 1998-2005 
 
Number of destinations with non-stop scheduled service in first 
week of July 
Airport 
1998 2003 2005 
Belfast City 18 17 17 
Belfast International 13 17 34 
Bristol 14 24 42 
Cardiff 10 18 20 
Cork 14 28 30 
Dublin 58 77 104 
Glasgow 40 38 58 
Liverpool 6 13 39 
Manchester 72 93 115 
Newcastle 18 22 39 
Nottingham 14 29 28 
Prestwick 3 9 18 
Shannon 19 21 32 
Source: OAG 
 
Table 6: Financial performance of sample airports FY 2003 
 




 Aeronautical Commercial Total 
  
Group 1 (high dependence on low cost traffic) 
Belfast Int. 3.32 2.97   6.29 5.05 19.8 
Bristol 5.64 5.04 10.68 5.00 53.2 
Liverpool 3.76 3.12   6.88 6.95  -1.1 
Nottingham  4.40 3.15   7.56 4.54 39.9 
Prestwick 5.52 4.90 10.42 8.49 18.5 
Average 4.53 3.84   8.37 6.01 25.9 
Group 2 (some dependence on low cost traffic) 
Cardiff 7.73 3.86 11.59 7.82 32.6 
DAA 3.43 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Glasgow 5.31 3.68   8.99 6.38 29.0 
Newcastle 6.66 3.64 10.30 6.92 32.8 
Average 5.10 3.73 10.29 7.04 31.5 
Group 3 (little or no dependence on low cost traffic) 
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Aberdeen 6.46 4.71 11.17 7.80 30.1 
Belfast City 4.33 2.34   6.78 6.49   4.2 
Durham T.Valley 9.30 4.09 13.39 13.91 -3.9 
Humberside 8.39 9.22 17.62 14.46 17.9 
London City 14.84 4.97 19.80 16.77 15.3 
Manchester 6.07 5.68 11.74 8.52 27.4 
Average 8.23 5.17 13.42 11.33 15.2 
Sources: CRI, DAA 
 24 
Table 7: Examples of new route incentive schemes 
 
All-inclusive passenger charge  Rebate on airport charges 
Manchester Cork/Shannon Glasgow Dublin 
Standard periods: 
- Y1 £3.00 
- Y2 £4.00 
- Y3 £5.00 
Cork: 
- Y1,Y2,Y3  3 Euro 
- Y4,Y5  5 Euro 
International: 
- Y1 Up to 50% 
- Y2 Up to 30% 
- Y3 Up to 10% 
Non EU routes: 
- Y1 100% 
- Y2 75% 
- Y3 50% 
- Y4 25% 
Off-peak periods: 
- Y1,Y2,Y3  £3.00 
- Y4 £5.00 
- Y5 £7.00 
Shannon: 
- Y1 1.5 Euro 
- Y2 2.5 Euro 
- Y3,Y4,Y5 3 Euro 
Domestic: 
- Y1 Up to 30% 
- Y2 Up to 20% 
- Y3 Up to 10% 
 











 Figure 2: Passenger traffic growth at UK airports(*) 1998-2003 
 




Figure 3:  Passenger traffic growth at Irish airports(+) 1998-2003 
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Figure 4: Passengers by type of airline at sample airports 2003 
 






Figure 5: Published airport charges and aeronautical revenues per WLU at sample 
airports for FY2003 
ncludes navigation charge only if levied by airport operator; data not available for all sample airports  
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(*) Charter data is not available for Cork/Shannon 














































































































   
 
 
